Both Humboldt and Sapir were found to have claimed the extreme relativity idea at some time in their publications. The extreme hypothesis associates language with mind, and this assumption has been shown to be irreconcilable with their other beliefs. Humboldt's beliefs regarding the genesis of language are incompatible with his identification of mind and language. Sapir is in the same boat. Internal conflicts within their various philosophical systems were highlighted, in other words.
Internal inconsistencies in Whorf's works are impossible to spot since he makes no meaningful comments regarding the origins of language. Behind Whorf's declaration of language's great effect on cognition appears to be the premise that language is a manifestation of man's mind or soul separate from his body, and hence not the product of his (collective) neurological system.
However, whereas the assumption of mind-body dualism can be found explicitly in Sapir's works, it cannot be found in Whorf's, despite the fact that dualism was presumably one of his implicit views. As a result, Whorf's statements and evidence in support of his assertions will be investigated individually and evaluated not just on the basis of non-contradiction, but also on whether current philosophy and science have given nullifying arguments or evidence.
"A new principle of relativity," according to Benjamin Lee Whorf, "says that all observers are not led to the same picture of the world by the same physical evidence unless their language backgrounds are comparable, or can be calibrated in some way." According to Whorf, the language one speaks influences not just one's worldview but also one's method of thinking. "Each language's background linguistic system (in other words, its grammar) is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas, but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and guide for the individual's mental activity, for his analysis of impressions, for his synthesis of mental stock in trade," he writes.
Whorf often phrased his hypothesis somewhat less strongly, using qualifying adverbs like "largely" to soften the assertion. "We cut up and organize the spread and flow of events as we do largely because, through our mother tongue, we are parties to an agreement to do so, not because nature itself is segmented in exactly that way for all to see," he says, with a caution reminiscent of Sapir's less extreme statements of linguistic relativity. This quotation might lead one to believe that the Whorf hypothesis is a modest claim. Whorf, on the other hand, is quite clear about the distinction between language and mind.
Actually, thinking is the most enigmatic of human abilities, and the study of language sheds the most light on it. This research demonstrates that the patterns of a person's thoughts are governed by inescapable rules of pattern that he is unaware of. These patterns are his own language's unperceived elaborate systematizations, as evidenced by a honest comparison and contrast with other languages, particularly those from a different linguistic family. His thoughts are written in a language, whether it's English, Sanskrit, or Chinese. The extreme theory of linguistic relativity, which connects cognition with language, is clearly asserted by Whorl.
Indeed, Whorl would have been able to use instances of how a particular language "segments reality" as evidence to support his argument only if he had considered language and cognition to be identical. He regularly cites linguistic data, notably from the Hopi language, as proof for the theory that language influences mind in his papers regarding the concept. Since thinking isn't a language, such examples can't be used to support the hypothesis.
Others have raised the same critique of Whorl, but without explaining that it was most likely because Whorf regards language and thinking to be the same thing that he saw his examples as credible proof of thought being impacted by language. Whorl "associated the'conceptual system' and the'world-view' with the language in which they were communicated, but simultaneously confusingly thinking of them as different," according to Max Black. (The parallel with Humboldt's identification of Geist with language while simultaneously holding them to be distinct is noteworthy.)
One of the most common current criticisms of Whorl's work is that he uses instances from language to argue for the effect of language on mind. Whorl's beliefs, according to Burling, "could only be tested from the standpoint of language." "When we cite differences between languages as evidence for differences in the mental processes of their speakers, we must realize that this is really no evidence at all; it merely points to the possibility of such differences in cognition that could be confirmed by appropriate investigation," Carroll reminds the reader of Whorl's works.
Hymes offers a similar issue, but adds that this objection may not apply to all of Whorf's concepts.
"In certain circumstances, Whorf asserted the presence of cognitive qualities molded by language based only on the linguistic traits from which they were inferred as proof." However, Whorf's well-known examples gathered as a fire insurance investigator might be used to support the theory that language can impact non-linguistic behavior. People smoking near "empty gasoline barrels," for example, are the effect of "empty" in English implying "absence of hazard," according to Whorf. He used this, as well as the "scrap lead" (each piece coated in paraffin paper) that caught fire, and numerous other examples of the name of the event influencing conduct.
The "name of the scenario" ("empty gasoline barrels" and "scrap lead") may have impacted the conduct of individuals who were close to the issue, but, as Longacre has shown, naming a situation is a function of language usage, not of the structure of the language in question. The fact that the drums were not adequately labeled as "gasoline fumes - hazard" or something similar, and the mound of lead was not properly labeled as "flammable rubbish," is not due to the English language's inadequacy. As a result, the conduct in relation to the labeled scenarios cannot be interpreted as proof of cognition (as manifested in behavior) being impacted by the language used to describe the situations.
To be sure, the persons in the aforementioned instances may have mistook the situation's name for its actuality. The drums were not truly empty, but rather brimming with gasoline vapor. There was not just lead in the scrap pile, but also lead, paraffin, and paper. Perhaps the folks in Whorf's examples are conflating the (poorly) articulated scenario with the actual one. If that's the case, "the" Whorf hypothesis may be better described as "the way individuals identify or describe things effects the way they behave related to those situations." The Whorf-Korzybski hypothesis, as this interpretation of Whorf's findings is known, has gotten a lot of attention, especially among followers of the General Semantics movement.
The modified "Whorf-Korzybski hypothesis," however, is a theory concerning language usage (parole) rather than language itself (langue). Whorf did state the extreme theory of linguistic relativity, as has been demonstrated. His proof for the idea, on the other hand, was limited to linguistic structure (Whorf's copious examples from Hopi and other Amerindian languages) and cases when individuals were deceived by specific names of circumstances. The impact of language on mind is not demonstrated in these cases.
While Whorf's data from the fire insurance inquiry appears to corroborate the modified Whorf-Korzybski hypothesis, it is neither the hypothesis he claimed to be supporting or the theory he openly proclaimed. As a result, I believe that certain of Whorf's arguments can only be understood if they are viewed as philosophical gifts from Hamann and Herder to Humboldt, and from Humboldt to Whorf (through Baudouin de Courtenay and Sapir).
Result
These assumptions, I contend, lack empirical backing and were accepted as true by Humboldt, Sapir, and Whorf on the authority of their forefathers or on the strength of their own sentiments that the assertions were true rather than on the basis of persuasive evidence. The initial claims by Hamann and Herder will be demonstrated to be counter-arguments to Kant's declaration of intrinsic capacities in the human mind, for which there appeared to be no proof.